Things don't do the same: most say the same things and think they're different



Dr.. Bakri Jack

A friend (let’s call him Hassan Rakobe) from the National Gathering and the Eastern Front, told me that one day he visited one of the comrades’ acquaintances in his house in Basmara (let’s call him a windmill friend) and found him watching a French channel when the European satellite could be captured by satellite dishes. Do you know French? Then Mill replied, “No.” Then he added, a rider. Why do you watch a French channel? The mill replied with the certainty of the knower, “You cannot answer a need.” This saying, “You cannot answer a need,” can be employed as a theoretical and conceptual framework to explain most of what is happening in the political scene in our country today.

Perhaps it is superfluous to say that the collective mind of any society (i.e., the way of thinking and dealing with reality, starting with its description and then its interpretation) is the product of a group of factors, including culture with its components of language as a way of thinking and as a cultural carrier and the sanctities of this culture, education curricula and ways of acquiring knowledge And how it is produced, the extent to which society is affected by its external environment, and other factors. As I wrote previously, part of the causes of the current situation in our cultural and political affairs has a direct and close relationship with the education curricula that elevate the theoretical and the absolute above the practical and applied, and it has a relationship with the Arabic language, which elevates the importance of expression and rhetoric at the expense of the content. And it has to do with the social imagination that is based on myth and fatalism and underestimates the rationality that links phenomena to causes.

In the past months, time allowed me to review all the charters and initiatives that were published, including the scandalous initiative, for which they gathered parties and entities. This and seventy political and social deterioration, and the rest of the educational loss is what the seven suffer from. All the charters issued by revolutionary forces and resistance committees, and all the initiatives issued by forces supporting the democratic transition, agree in the demands of the Sudanese about the establishment of a democratic civil state on the basis of equal citizenship, social justice and qualitative justice. Constitution, border protection and defense of the citizenship state. Most of these charters and initiatives talk about building a state of institutions that separate powers (legislative, executive and judicial) and guarantee the independence of the judiciary as a means to the rule of law so that people are equal under it, rulers and those who are ruled. All of these charters and initiatives speak of transitional justice that guarantees the fulfillment of truth and the end of grievances, including retribution for the martyrs, the wounded, and the detainees. The main points of contention in it are: 1) whether there should be a role for the army in the transitional phase 2) the nature of the constitutional arrangements for the transitional phase and whether or not there is a need for a Sovereignty Council or not 3) the lineage in the formation of the transitional legislative council 4) which is first Forming a Legislative Council that selects the prime minister, who in turn forms the government, or chooses a prime minister and forms a government before starting the formation of the Legislative Council. The witness is that all the charters and initiatives presented the question of power and the transitional period on foundational issues such as the permanent constitution and institution-building, and I assumed that this would come later, as they all neglected to talk about the tools of resistance and assumed that this coup would fall in some way, so I got involved in talking about the arrangements for the transitional government. .

The strange thing is that the greatest common denominator between these charters and initiatives is that they do not talk about the mechanisms, means and tools that will achieve those absolute goals, such as the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council (whether by election or appointment, since how is the devil of details) or how the armies will be unified according to A new doctrine or how institutions will be built (from a competent judicial apparatus including the establishment of a constitutional court) and a state apparatus (civil service, independent government agencies, police and security agencies) or how we will restore completely hijacked state institutions by cartels that employ the state apparatus to gain legitimacy social and political. The main reason why the Sudanese mind and the Sudanese political actor does not think about the question of how is the manifestation of this mind that assumes that things do themselves and it is enough for us to write them or talk about them. . Or perhaps it can be interpreted with the wisdom of our brother Tahounah, inspired by the French channel, “You can’t answer a need.”

Although the goals of the revolutionary forces supporting the democratic transition in the absolute, according to what is written, are almost identical, the observer of the current political discourse, despite its shallowness, may believe that there are deep and fundamental differences between these forces, which sometimes describe each other according to their desires and insist on packaging each other in positions Closer to knowledge of intentions than knowledge of declared political positions. This insistence has nothing to do with politics or sometimes declared positions, and its interpretation may lie in the nature of the mind that produces this discourse, political jealousy, personalizing public work, and insisting on putting people in positions only to achieve something of distinction, a sense of political correctness and moral superiority. . Even those who believe in themselves that they are advocates of radical change do not, in fact, disagree with the advocates of change (the gentlemen) in most of the goals. Since in any reality governed by any amount of rationality, the difference in means and mechanisms is logical, natural and desirable for development.

In summary, if we were to resort to the declared positions (in writing and in word) of most of the political actors in the forces of the revolution, there is nothing to explain the hostility and demagoguery and the manifestations of disagreements that are rife with the media, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the dispute is about the means and mechanisms that each actor adopts. This is not true. Most of the revolutionary actors demonstrate and participate in breakfasts and vigils and participate in sit-ins and strikes, and all of them want to build a democratic civil state based on equal citizenship, which is what must be worked on and the postponement of what is programmatic. to polling stations. These are common to develop an integrated vision for change to become a political discourse for the revolution and a diplomatic discourse presented to regional actors, so what is difficult about that? It is political reason, jealousy, personalization of the public, and the absence of rationality that makes us watch our situation as if we are helpless, and of course there is a hypothesis that “you can answer a need” that even the revolutionaries themselves work with. If we reflect on our matter wisely and with determination, what we want is present before our eyes all, and perhaps it is better for each actor to write how he will achieve his goals in order to clarify to what degree that our belief in the greatness of our differences is purely a manifestation of what is subjective and has no objective elements. It is subject to dialogue and change. As for subjective prejudices, they justify their permanence by themselves in a circular and non-critical manner, and for the French guarantee that “you don’t answer a need” we can answer a need.


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